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Abstract
In the early 1990s, the U.S. lodging industry witnessed a severe shortage of debt capital as traditional lenders
exited the market. During this period hotel lending was revolutionized by the emergence of real estate debt
securities. The author discusses key factors which have affected the growth and development of commercial
mortgage backed securities and their changing role as a significant source of debt capital to the lodging
industry.
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Securitization of lodging 
real estate finance 
by A.J. Singh 
In the early 1 9 9 0 ~ ~  the U.S. lodging industry partially fill in the credit gap and 
witnessed a severe shortage of debt capital take advantage of the depressed 
as tradition& lenders exited the market. 
Durfng this period hotel lending was revolu- estate. In 
tionizw' bv the emergence of real estate ~articular, new debt instruments 
debt secirities. The iuthor discusses key L c h  as 'commercial mortgage 
factos which have affected the growth and 
develooment of commerc~al mortoeoe backed securities (CMBS), collat- ~ - , ~  .~ ~- ~- 
- -~~.-  
baakedsecurities and their changing role as eralized mortgage obligations 
a significant source of debt capital to the (CMOS) and real estate mortgage 
Idging industry. investment conduits (REMICS) 
A n historical review of financing in the lodging industry indicates a 
cyclical pattern. During certain 
periods, capital has been readily 
available, while during other 
periods the industry has suffered 
from a dearth of capital. 
In the 1980s, for example, 
excess capital availability resulted 
in a period of overbuilding, 
whereas the early 1990s were 
characterized by a financing 
drought. During the cyclical down- 
turn and retrenchment of tradi- 
tional lending sources, alternative 
sources of financing emerged to 
emerged during this period as new 
investment vehicles which revolu- 
tionized the way in which cornmer- 
cia1 real estate is financed. 
Today capital sources for mort- 
gage debt are more than four times 
the size of equity markets, and as 
of September 2001, non- govern- 
ment CMBS issuance was a t  
$247.8 billion, constituting about 
15 percent of the $1.676 trillion 
debt market.' Undoubtedly, 
CMBS's have become a major 
source of capital for commercial 
real estate. 
Historical approach taken 
&ven the importance of debt 
securities in financing commercial 
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real estate, the study was designed 
to comprehensively review and 
analyze the evolution of mortgage- 
backed securities which emerged in 
the 1990s to finance the lodging 
industry. During each phase of their 
evolution, the study will highlight 
specific fadors and events which 
have shaped the innovative debt 
instruments and their market. 
Furthermore, the study discusses 
the outlook of the CMBS market 
and the impact of securitization on 
real estate finance. 
This is historical research 
which relies upon secondary litera- 
ture, including texts, relevant arti- 
cles, research studies, and other 
significant documents from each of 
the periods studied. Commenting 
on historical research, Baum- 
gartner states that "using the 
historical approach, the researcher 
endeavors to record and under- 
stand events of the past. In turn, 
interpretations of recorded history 
hold to provide better under- 
standing of the present and suggest 
possible future directions."' 
Topic is not new 
The need to create liquidity and 
a secondary market in commercial 
real estate is not new. Some of the 
early initiatives in this area included 
the "mortgage backed bonds of the 
1920s, the real estate (mortgage) 
trusts of the early 1970s, the indus- 
trial revenue bonds and mortgage 
participations and the syndications 
of the 1980s." 
As interest rates skymcketed in 
the late 1970s, capital flow to 
commercial and residential mort- 
gages ceased because portfolio 
lenders viewed illiquid real estate 
loans unfavorably. To resolve this 
capital crisis, the federal govern- 
ment intervened by setting up 
federal government agencies such as 
the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMAor Fannie Mae), 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie 
Mac), and Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA or 
Ginnie Mae). They began 
purchasing mortgages from lenders 
such as banks and life insurance 
companies, and issued mortgage- 
backcd securities to investors. 
Investors were mainly attracted to 
these securities because of the 
default guarantees provided by the 
government agencies. 
The involvement of the federal 
government on such as large scale 
played a critical role by providing 
early momentum which helped 
establish the secondary mortgage 
market. In the 1970s this direct-sale 
program, as it was known, was 
Further extended by the creation of 
mortgage-backed securities. 'This 
was the beginning of one of the most 
important developments in real 
estate lending that has occurred 
since the invention of the mortgage 
itself-the securitization of mort- 
gage debt.'" 
Commercial securities sold 
The 1981 Economic Recovery 
Tax Act (ERTA) real estate tax 
incentives, declining interest 
rates, and deregulation of the 
savings and loan association 
created a conducive setting for the 
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development and sale of commer- 
cial securities. As capital flow 
increased for commercial real 
estate, a few insurance companies, 
banks, and savings and loans 
started to utilize commercial 
mortgage originators, albeit 
slowly. The secondary market in 
real estate began when lenders in 
a particular geographical area 
who had more available capital 
than demand for it bought mort- 
gages from lenders in geograph- 
ical areas that had a shortage of 
capital. By 1985, the total 
issuance of commercial mortgage 
securities was $2.7 billion, 
growing to $8.3 billion by 1991. 
Whiie the size of this capital 
market was relatively small in 
1980, and growth rate very slow, 
significant developments during 
this period helped organize this 
emerging market for commercial 
real estate debt securities. First, 
investment banks such as 
Salomon Brothers, First Boston, 
Morgan Stanley, Drexel, and 
others began to take notice of this 
market and used their expertise in 
the residential secondary market 
to design similar issues for 
commercial securities. Second, as 
banks became involved in the sale 
of these securities they created 
multiple financial securities (prod- 
ucts which they could sell) based 
on the riskheturn appetite of the 
investors, called "tranches," which 
refers to the multiple risk classes 
in a commercial real estate loan 
pool; this further deepened the 
market for debt securities. Third, 
the creation of tranches required 
the assignment of a risk rating to 
each class; as a result, Standard 
and Poor's began to assign risk 
ratings during this period. Thus 
began a period of formal analysis 
and evaluation, which provided 
investors with information and 
transparency about these new 
financial products. 
Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 ushered in a new era of secu- 
ritization by creating Real Estate 
Mortgage Conduits (REMICS). 
This new structure facilitated the 
pooling and securitization of mort- 
gages, broadened the appeal of the 
mortgage security to a wider 
group of investors, and gained 
preferred tax treatment for both 
issuers and investors. 
1990s brings maturity 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
directly contributed to the devel- 
opment of the market for commer- 
cial mortgage backed securities 
(CMBS) in another significant 
way. The legislation made invest- 
ment in commercial real estate 
less attractive by reversing tax and 
other accounting benefits accrued 
from previous legislation. Hotel 
and other commercial real estate 
projects initiated before the 
passage of the TRA were conceived 
as tax-sheltered vehicles which 
now became unprofitable and 
resulted in an overbuilt commer- 
cial real estate industry by 1989.' 
As the industry collapsed 
under the burden of highly lever- 
aged real estate assets, lenders 
foreclosed on numerous delinquent 
loans and were consequently 
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saddled with a large portfolio of 
non-performing loans. Congress 
passed the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforce- 
ment Act in 1989 (FIRREA), which 
chartered the Resolution Trust 
Corporation to help liquidate the 
savings and loan loans and real 
estate owned properties. Invest- 
ment banks were hired by the RTC 
to underwrite and dispose these 
non-performing loans. By 1993, 
the RTC had disposed of approxi- 
mately $14 billion in commercial 
real estate assets through the 
CMBS market. 
A variety of factors made the 
CMBS product attractive to insti- 
tutional investors and lenders 
during this period. Most tradi- 
tional lenders facing recent losses 
from direct lending to commercial 
real estate were more comfortable 
with the liquidity of a real estate 
security. Furthermore, FIRREA 
imposed stricter lending regula- 
tions that required them to main- 
tain higher loan loss reserves and 
provided traditional lenders, such 
as life insurance companies a 
reason to shift debt capital to 
CMBSs. The impact of these 
factors resulted in a dramatic 
growth in the issuance of CMBs 
from 1990 to 1992 (See Table 1). 
The confluence of these factors 
resulted in a significant transfor- 
mation of the secondary market for 
securitized debt in the early 1990s; 
as a result, by 1993 the total 
issuance of CMBSs increased to 
$17.5 billion. 
New period begins 
Weak real estate markets and 
the RTC's need for an efficient loan 
exit strategy drove the CMBS loan 
pools in the early 1990s: By 1993, 
the original pools of non-performing 
loans dried up and issuers needed a 
fresh allotment of loan pools to 
sustain the emerging market for 
CMBSs. Therefore, beginning in 
1993, securitization entered a new 
period called "conduit lending." 
Working with correspondent 
mortgage lenders (the conduits), 
investment banks purchased mort- 
gages expressly for creating debt 
securities for sale in the secondary 
market. From 1993-95, loan 
conduit lenders and investment 
bankers actively solicited and 
searched for mortgages and "manu- 
factured" them into securities for 
sale in the secondary market. Their 
efforts sustained the CMBS 
market, which grew by 40 percent, 
for the next two years (See Table 1). 
Whereas CMBS was a "problem 
solving" tool in the early 1990s, it 
now became an "opportunity tool."" 
The conduit market slowed down in 
1995 as portfolio lenders such as life 
insurance companies returned to 
real estate capital markets, making 
direct commercial real estate loans, 
and competed directly with issuers 
of debt securities. 
With a growing economy and 
low interest rates, there was a 
strong interest in real estate invest- 
ments from 1996 to 1998. This 
period also saw strong growth and 
maturation of the CMBS market, 
with a cumulative growth of 183.5 
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Table 1 
Total issuance of commercial mortgage backed securities 
1984 to 2003 (August 29) 
Year Total Issuance Growth (Billions) Percentage 
1984 $0.2 
1985 2.7 1250% 
1986 1.1 (59.25) 
1987 0.9 (18.2) 
1988 1.2 33.0 
1989 1.7 42.0 
1990 4.8 182.3 
- 
1991 8.2 70.8 
----- 
, . 
2003 (Aug 29) 53.7 
-- 
Source: Commeclal Moilgage Alelt 
percent from 1996 to 1998 (See component of securitized loans also 
Table 1). The CMBS market started increased, with a peak in 1998 of 12 
to slow down after reaching a p e ~ e n t  (See Table 2). 
market ~ e a k  in 1998 with a total 
issuance of $78 billion. From 1996 
~ ~ ~ k ~ t  in 2000 declines 
to 2000, the lodging industry The new millennium saw a 
witnessed its strongest perfor- 
mance in terms of demand, relatively softer C W S  market in 
revenue, and profitability growth, the United States. Total issuance 
and growth through mergerJ and that year was $61 billion, as  
acouisitions. Conseauentlv, during compared to $67 billion in 1999, 
the period from 1997 to 1999 the with total hotel issuance of $4.7 
percentage of hotel loans as a billion as compared to $6.7 billion in 
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Table 2 
Issuance of hotel CMBS 
1995-2002 
Year Total Hotel Hotel CMBS 
Issuance Percentage To (Billions) Total Issuance 
1995 $0.0 00% 
1997 .4 9.4 
1998 9.7 12.3 
1999 6.7 9.9 
2000 4.7 7.7 
2001 5.9 6.0 
2002 (Ql) .5 3.9 
Sourre: Commercial Mongage Alert 
the previous year. A lack of proper- 
ties in need of refinancing combined 
with rising interest rates were two 
factors which influenced the low 
CMBS volume in 2000. Specifically, 
as of August 2000, CMBSs backed 
with hotel and retail mortgages 
waned in popularity? Nevertheless, 
in the more recent environment of 
2001-02, CMBSs preserved their 
status as a mature financing 
vehicle and an important source of 
debt capital for the commercial real 
estate industry. 
' h o  issues have affected the 
current environment of the CMBS 
marketplace. First, the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, 
accelerated the already weakening 
economy and real estate markets. 
Second, while the "event crisis" 
generated by the attack affected all 
property types, the effect on certain 
property types, such as hotels, was 
much more catastrophic. These two 
combined effects of the terrorist 
attacks resulted in a reduction of 
CMBS issues in 2002. The outlook 
in 2003 is more positive, with the 
issuance as of the first half of 2003 
at $41.22 billion as compared to 
$31.74 billion for the same period 
last year, an increase of about 30 
percent. Commercial mortgage 
backed securities spreads also 
continued to narrow, a further 
reflection of the shortage of new 
issues (See Table 3). 
Downgrades expected 
Most market analysts expect to 
see more downgrades versus 
upgrades as rating agencies take 
stock of the current environment 
and as delinquency rates on loans 
rise, resulting in loan defaults. 
Ninety percent of the participants 
responding to a CMBS World 
survey expected delinquency rate to 
rise. The most pessimistic projec- 
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Table 3 
Commercial mortgage backed securities 
trading spreads above isyear treasury bonds (in basis points) 
1998-2002 
Class 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Returns of 10-year 
treasurv bonds 4.87% 6.44% 5.11% 5.05% 3.81 
CMBS trading spreads 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
AAA t140 t124 t147 t130 t93 
AA t165 +I44 t162 t150 t107 
A t190 t164 t177 t175 t122 
BBB t270 t210 t235 t225 +I83 
BBB- t350 t295 t280 t265 t224 
BB t575 t525 t525 t575 t450 
B 4 2 5  4 0 0  +815 tlOOO t950 
Sourre: Maqan Stanley Dean Winel 
tions were 5 percent with opti- 
mistic estimates being 1.22 
percent! Compared to 1.6 percent 
in 2000 and 6 7  percent in 1999, 
this is a monumental increase. 
Examples of recent downgrades by 
rating agencies Moody's and Fitch's 
default projections outlined in 
Tables 4 and Table 5 illustrate the 
current mood of CMBS analysts. 
The downgrades in Table 4 were 
loans collateralized by five upscale 
Hilton hotels, a segment which was 
most impacted by the recent down- 
turn in travel. Interestingly, recent 
survey results reveal that CMBS 
market participants were more 
concerned about limited service 
hotels versus full-service hotels 
with regard to loan originations and 
inclusion in CMBS loan pools." 
While the short term forecast 
for the lodging industry is 
pessimistic, industry analysts are 
more confident of growth and 
recovery in 2003. In a recent inter- 
view, Jacques Brand, managing 
director with Deutsche Bank, 
Table 4 
Moody's downgrade of HHPT 2000-HLT 
March 14,2002 
Class To From Notches 
E Baal A2 7 
Sourre: Moody$, Merrill Lynch 
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stated, 'mere is virtually no hotel 
supply coming online in the late 
2002 and certainly not any in 2003. 
Therefore, with virtually no new 
supply and with demand histori- 
cally growing with GDP, the 
industry should be poised for 
growth in 2003. As the U.S. comes 
out of this ewnomic downturn over 
the next year, I expect the lodging 
sector to fare extremely well."lo 
The results of Table 5 indicate 
an overall increase in expected 
defaults and delinquencies in the 
CMBS portfolio. Not surprisingly, 
hotels are expected to default at a 
higher rate than the wre properties 
(4.0 percent versus .60 percent). The 
expectation of increasing defaults in 
the hotel sedor partly explains the 
reason why CMBS originations and 
issuances are low this year. In a 
recent interview, Arthur Adler of 
Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels said that 
lenders are having diEculty under- 
writing the hotel industry based on 
the uncertainty in their future 
performance as an aftermath of 
September 11." 
Analysts at  rating agencies 
such as Moody's and Fitch are being 
extremely cautious and conserva- 
tive in including hotels in the loan 
pool and rating hotel mortgages. 
Moody's believes that it might take 
a year or more for travel patterns 
and lodging demand to reach 
normalized levels. Additionally, in 
their opinion, recovery will not be 
uniform but based on the market 
segment and l~cation.'~ 
Conservatism is present 
In a similar vein, Fitch plans to 
take a very conservative approach 
in underwriting hotel assets by 
reducing the 12-month trailing 
REVPAR by 20 percent. Further- 
more, their analysis will inflate 
fixed and variable expenses in light 
of recent increases in costs. In 
particular, the cost for insurance for 
commercial properties has risen 
since September 11. Hotels in 
particular expect these costs to 
increase from 15 to 50 percent, 
depending on the line of coverage. 
Referring to insurance costs, Tony 
Rodolakis, vice president of risk 
management for Stanvood Hotels & 
Resorts, recently stated, "The 
biggest increases are on the prop- 
Table 5 
DefaulVdelinquency rate outlook 
2000 vs. 2002 
Property 2000 Default September 2001 2002 Default 2002 
T V D ~  Rate Delinouencv Rate Rate Delinouenw Rate . . . . . . 
Core' 0.40% 0.80% 0.60% 1.55% 
Hotels 1.50 2.50 4.0 7.50 
Healthcare 3.50 9.50 3.50 13.88 
*Core properties (office, retail, multi-family and industrial) 
Soum: JP Morgan and Fitch 
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erty side. We are in the midst of 
renewing now and anticipate a 50 
percent increase. "I4 
Losses less severe 
While CMBS issuances are 
expected to pick up in the second 
half of 2002, the outlook for the 
balance of 2002 is lower than 2001 
levels. This is the combined result of 
rising delinquency rates, concern 
over the health of the hotel, health 
care, and retail sectors, potential for 
increasing interest rates, decline in 
loan maturities, and the threat of 
new terrorist activities. Overall, the 
CMBS issuances and secondary 
market volume should remain 
healthy throughout the year, 
responding to events as they unfold 
in an orderly manner.'' 
Key results from CMBS World's 
recent survey further strengthen 
this expected outlook. Survey 
participants indicated that losses 
will be less severe than the last 
recession, with more than 56 
percent of the participants believing 
that the CMBS market will sunive 
the economic downturn and actu- 
ally emerge stronger; another 33 
percent believe that it wiU survive 
but remain the same. As testimony 
to the purported market discipline 
imposed by the securitization 
process, two thirds of the respon- 
dents indicated that underwriting 
on deals would be tougher. with a 
strong consensus on this question 
among investment bankers, 
investors, originators, and rating 
agencies.'" 
Finally, as the CMBS market 
continues to evolve, three events 
will affect the future development of 
the secondary market. First, since 
November 2000, new ERISA 
(Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act) legislation has 
allowed pension fund managers to 
invest in CMBS tranches rated 
BBB or higher. With this change, 
the eligible securities for invest- 
ment increased by about 25 percent, 
which in turn may increase the 
capital flow into the C B S  market. 
Second, recent analyst research has 
identified a strong correlation 
between the movement of CMBS 
spreads and spreads of similar 
maturity interest swaps. Using this 
information, a portfolio manager 
could "reduce interest rate risk on 
warehoused loans by building 
hedge positions as the warehouse 
portfolio grows, then unwind the 
hedge upon issuing the CMBS secu- 
rities collateralized by the loans." 
Finally, the biggest issue in 
today's market is the lack of buyers 
for the lowest CMBS tranches, 
termed as "B-piece buyers." Since 
there are very few firms which 
purchase these lowest rated and 
highest risk tranches, they exert a 
strong influence on the process of 
securitization. They have a strong 
voice in determining which loans 
are included in the securitized 
pools, and can demand the removal 
of loans which they feel are too 
risky In effect, their actions raise 
the quality of tranches they 
purchase and increase the overall 
quality of the security issue. In the 
future, the extent to which the 
CMBS issuers are successful in 
retaining and attracting more firms 
Singh 
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to absorb these lower-rated 
tranches, the secondary market 
will remain flat, grow, or decline." 
As the 21st century progresses, 
the interrelated events and lessons 
learned in the past decades have 
restructured capital sources and 
redesigned lodging industry 
finance in many ways. With the 
introduction of new sources of 
finance, the lodging industry is no 
longer dependent solely on the 
traditional lending sources such as 
commercial banks and life insur- 
ance companies. Securitization 
created a new financing vehicle by 
introducing a public source of 
capital. With the creation of new 
and alternate sources of financing 
and resultant increase in competi- 
tion within the capital markets, 
borrowers may benefit by a reduc- 
tion in the cost of capital. While 
competition may favorably impact 
the cost of capital for borrowers, 
they are now faced with more strin- 
gent underwriting terms with the 
introduction of rating agencies that 
critically analyze and rate securi- 
ties based on the quality of 
the mortgage collateral. This, 
however, is beneficial to the 
industry as a whole by introducing 
market discipline, which should 
prevent the overbuilding excesses 
of the 1980s." 
Base is broadened 
With the introduction of trad- 
able securities, the investor base for 
commercial real estate has broad- 
ened. Previously, capital sources for 
the industry were restricted to 
those who were knowledgeable 
about a particular property type, 
such as hotels. With the introduc- 
tion of securities backed by a diver- 
sified asset base and rated to suit 
the risk tolerance of investors, 
knowledge of hotel industry 
dynamics is not a prerequisite for 
investment. 
As real estate and public 
markets become more integrated, 
capital market factors exogenous to 
the property markets have an 
impact on the flow of capital to real 
estate. For example, the Asian 
currency crisis disrupted fmed- 
income markets and triggered 
widening CMBS spreads in the fall 
of 1997. None of these events had 
anything to do with local property 
market dynamics.lg Conversely, 
however, positive global market 
factors will result in increased 
capital flow to real estate. 
When hotel borrowers are not 
able to meet their payments, they 
were previously accustomed to 
dealing with their neighborhood 
banker who worked with them 
based on past relationships. 
However, with securitization, 
pooling and servicing agreements 
transfer the administration of 
delinquent loans to special 
servicers who then will decide in 
favor of a workout or foreclosure, 
purely on the merits of the case. 
After receiving their early 
impetus in the 1970s with the 
involvement of the federal govern- 
ment in providing liquidity to the 
residential capital markets, the 
secondary mortgage markets 
continued to grow through the 
1980s with the involvement of 
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investment banks that engineered 
specific investment bonds to suit 
the commercial investor. As tradi- 
tional lending sources reduced 
significantly, the CMBS markets 
grew rapidly and matured in the 
1990s. While the growth in 
issuance of CMBS offerings has 
slowed in the past few years, they 
are recognized as a significant 
financing vehicle comprising 15 
percent of the market for debt 
capital. 
The increased competition, 
which this new source of financing 
brought to the capital markets, has 
resulted in lower financing costs for 
hotels, while exposing them to 
changes exogenous to the hotel 
property markets, as well as to 
more merit-based foreclosure risks. 
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